Vladimir
Vasyutin | | | ||||
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December 1996 Gagarin Military Aviation Academy scientists held a military-scientific
conference on problems of Air Force operational art and tactics.
After a comprehensive assessment of these problems, the scientists maintained at the conference that one of the most important tasks of the military science in modern conditions concern settlement of problems facing the Armed Forces (Air Force including) related to operational art and tactics to outline a comprehensive system of theoretical provisions and practical recommendations aimed at the preparation, planning and execution of operations, combat actions of the various scale and effective use of weapons.  The
scientists noted that the current Air Force operational art and tactics
resolve such principally vital questions as military aviation employment
in large-scale and regional wars, using conventional and nuclear weapons,
creating required (theoretically) aviation groupings on major strategic
directions, preparing and executing combat missions in independent and
joint operations to gain air superiority, defeat hostile nuclear missile
and air defense groupings, control systems, reserves, etc. |
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| At the same time, it is necessary to determine
the tasks, goals, forms and ways of Air Force employment in a different
light, with due account of the Armed Forces reductions and the fact that
the NATO Air Forces outnumber the Russian Air Force sixfold (fourfold with
regard to quantity-quality ratio).
Today the problem of aviation formations and units participation in local wars and armed conflicts, peacekeeping operations, and provision of assistance to our allies, etc. has acquired special importance. Now the Air Force is more able to perform tasks aimed at defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russia than other services of Armed Forces. However, owing to traditional conditions of large-scale wars, it is necessary to tackle some operational art issues differently, for example, the problem of gaining air superiority. Evidently, this problem should be settled in two stages: at the initial stage (repulsion of aggression) the Air Force should deny the enemy air superiority period and when launching counteroffensive (offensive) operations, the Air Force should gain air superiority. The second provision concerns the so-called "non-contact" forms of combat actions in local wars and armed conflicts, where our Air Force carries out operations similar to those carried out during the Persian Gulf War, and where the ground forces of conflicting sides are not directly engaged in combat actions and war goals are achieved through the use of air and space-deployed weapon systems. Besides, an eventual enemy is also planning aerospace "Blitzkrieg". Consequently, the considerable reduction of Air Force necessitated an urgent review and settlement of problems associated with the creation and preparation of aviation groupings intended to remove aerospace threat on the main strategic directions. Special attention should also be paid to tactical problems associated with the possibility of using limited forces to perform an increased number of combat tasks. This is associated, first of all, with the advent of high-precision weapons that can selectively defeat assigned targets on the principle: "A point strikes a mass". The most urgent and complicated problems that require immediate settlement are associated with the creation of the adequate infrastructure on the main strategic directions. Currently, owing to a considerable dispersion of Air Force bases, formations, groupings and units, another acute problem arises that can be settled only on the international level of authority. This problem consists in involving the air forces of the CIS countries in operations (combat actions) or, at least, in using their aerodromes by our Air Force. It should also be borne in mind that on each war theater there are aircraft units and formations of Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, Navy, etc., in addition to pure Air Force formations. They have tasks of their own and are not united in organizational and mobilizational aspects. However, if a war breaks out then the aviation of these services of the Armed Forces can and should be called to perform jointly one and the same task. Academy scientists also brought to light other problems related to the theory of dog fighting of supermaneuverable aircraft, combat control, mobilization and the combat readiness of large aviation formations and units and their all-round support. They worked out recommendations determining the operational arts and tactics of the Air Force. The essence of these recommendations is as follows. 1. Given current considerable enemy superiority in aviation on the main strategic directions and importance of air superiority as the indispensable condition for success during combat on land and at sea, it is necessary to work out theoretical provisions concerned with the preparation and conduct of operations to gain air superiority, determination of the missions and tasks of services of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and introduction of these provisions in normative and legislative documents. 2. The operational art of the Air Force in present conditions should focus on more defined forms and ways of combat actions of large aviation formations and units in local wars and armed conflicts. A detailed examination of all problems associated with waging "non-contact" wars and selective use of high-precision weapons should make the basis of this work. 3. It is expedient to develop a theory for using the Air Force as a deterrent factor against the aerospace threat, participation of a limited contingent of air forces in peacekeeping and special operations in cooperation with the means and forces of other ministries and services as a new branch related to the Air Force operational art. 4. A new theory of aerial combat needs to be developed for supermaneuverable aircraft based on the use of multichannel sighting systems, highly mobile missiles, including air-to-air backward-launched missiles, and increased physical fitness of pilots. 5. Continue research work in the development of new ways of control to create a computer network and a package of software intended for automated control on the regimental, divisional and army levels. 6. Given the insufficient level of aviation infrastructural development and inadequate air force strength of large aviation formations against the enemy on the main strategic directions, research work should be conducted promptly to assess the posture of each theater of war to determine the required reserves of aviation means of destruction and aviation materiel, as well as the tailoring of inter-theater groupings of large aviation formations. The settlement of current problems facing the operational art and tactics of the Air Force will enhance their combat capability, determine their development and subsequent build-up.  |
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