INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS

The United States is doing its best to prevent Cyprus from buying Russian-made S-300PMU1 antiaircraft missile systems The purchase of the Russian missiles by Cyprus means Moscow's recognition, de jure and de facto, as a possible arms supplier to Western Europe. This Washington will not allow. Western Europe is the largest market for U.S. arms producers, and they do not wish to share it with Russia. They also fear that Cyprus may be followed by Greece, which has invited tenders for antiaircraft systems for its Armed Forces. U.S. Patriot missiles are expected to face competition there from Russia's S-300. 
 

Moscow is another matter. As if to corroborate the U.S. intelligence data received by the Russian Defense Ministry, Turkey's Air Force planes have been intruding into Cyprus' airspace almost every day. Turkey has been violating international law in this way for more than a decade. In 1974, similar provocations resulted in the Air Force-covered landing of 30,000 Turkish troops on Cyprus and the annexation of the island's northern part. 
At that time the Cypriots 

couldn't counter the Turkish military machine. Now the purchase of S-300PMU1 missiles would let them rebuff any air attack. In a mere 20 to 30 seconds after takeoff Turkish aircraft heading for Cyprus would be within reach of the Russian-made missiles. The S-300PMU1 radar station would make it possible to keep watch over activities at Turkish Air Force bases located largely on Turkey's eastern and southern coasts. Such a location reduces Turkish aircraft's time of flight to targets in Greece and on Cyprus and lets Ankara count on the surprise factor. 

The warning received by Moscow is nothing but a means of psychological pressure. Yet Nicosia has found itself exposed to far more serious pressure. On the one hand, Turkey incessantly demonstrates its readiness to use force. Ankara fears that the deployment of S-300 missiles on Cyprus will deprive Turkey of the surprise factor. On the other hand, Cyprus is now under diplomatic pressure from the United States which, now and then, enlists the services of Britain and other countries. 

For example, not long ago Cyprus received Sweden's Foreign Minister Lund who came on a working visit. The representative of the neutral state, the interests of which in the Mediterranean region in no way clash with those of Russia or some other country, tried to convince the Cypriots to turn down the contract with Russia. He cited possible difficulties in considering Cyprus' admission to the European Union. 

The discourteous interference of the Swedish minister in a matter that did not concern his country irritated the Cypriot government. The Swedish diplomat had to admit that he was fulfilling an insistent recommendation of Britain to exert pressure on Cyprus. London, however, denied it had asked Stockholm for anything like that. Betrayed by Britain, the Swedish minister found himself in an awkward position. 

Anyhow, Stockholm became one of the executors of Washington's plans to exert various kinds of pressure on Nicosia, from brainwashing Cypriot taxpayers into believing that their government spends too much money on defense to disseminating palpable disinformation. 

Special importance in this campaign is given to efforts to settle the Cyprus-Turkey conflict. The United States undertook the intermediary mission shortly after Cyprus and Russia signed the S-300s contract. 

Washington's "responsiveness" is easily explained. The U.S. Administration suddenly realized that Cyprus' interest in the Russian missiles became a practical issue. 

Of course, Cyprus has never been an important arms market for the USA. That is not the point. The purchase of the Russian missiles by Cyprus means Moscow's recognition, de jure and de facto, as a possible arms supplier to Western Europe. This Washington will not allow. Western Europe is the largest market for U.S. arms producers, and they do not wish to share it with Russia. They also fear that Cyprus may be followed by Greece, which has invited tenders for antiaircraft systems for its Armed Forces. U.S. Patriot missiles are expected to face competition there from Russia's S-300. 

The Americans try to avoid direct rivalry between these systems. The Patriot's combat characteristics will approach those of S-300PMU1 only in its third, modified generation, which has not yet been tested and which is planned to be put in service with the U.S. Armed Forces only in the next century. And even then the Patriot will hardly equal the S-300. The Cypriots were convinced of the Russian system's advantage during test firings in Russia's Arkhangelsk Region. The missiles were fired against several flying targets, and all of the targets were fully destroyed. 

This distinction is one more important difference between the S-300 and the Patriot. During the Gulf war, Patriots missed several of Iraq's Scud missiles which burst on Israeli territory. It turned out that Patriots (as a rule, three Patriot missiles were fired against one Scud) hit the rear part of the Iraqi missiles, not destroying them, but only deflecting them from course. 

Returning to Washington's intermediary mission, it should be said that reconciling the Greek Cypriots and Turks is not an easy task. The mistrust that has taken root between them can be overcome only if the island is completely demilitarized and if the international community guarantees that there will be no more aggression on Turkey's part. Nicosia, supported by Athens, has expressed its readiness to waive the S-300 supplies on such terms. 
So Washington is doing its best to create an illusion that there is progress in the solution of this problem. The White House has proposed creating a "no-fly" zone over Cyprus. The idea sounds tempting, and both Nicosia and Athens have supported it. 

However, this initiative will hardly be of any practical importance. The proposed "no-fly" zone in Cyprus will differ greatly from similar zones created over northern and southern Iraq where U.S. Air Force troops are authorized to shoot down any Iraqi aircraft intruding into them. In Cyprus, the United States has proposed only recording intrusions. Washington has no intention to down intruding Turkish aircraft as Turkey is its NATO ally. At the same time, it will hardly manage to convince Ankara to abide by no-fly zone rules voluntarily because Turkey supplies its troops in northern Cyprus mostly by air. 

The fulfillment of the Russia-Cyprus contract will deliver a heavy blow to U.S. arms makers' prestige and positions on the market. As a last resort, to preserve these positions, the United States may give Turkey a free hand.