ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN SETTLING THE BERLIN CRISIS

Victor Lyubimov,
Captain 1st rank, Rtd
 

I would like to relate the story about the participation of intelligence agencies in general and the Main Intelligence Directorate (Russian acronym GRU) of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff in particular, and their efforts to settle the 1961 Berlin crisis.

However, those flights were only a prelude to other far-reaching plans. In May-June 1960, a most valuable source from the GRU, named «Murat,» presented to his command a copy of a U.S. plan for delivering nuclear strikes against the USSR and its East European allies. The Atomic Strike Plan (#110/59) of November 16, 1959, described in detail the scale, tasks, and overall objectives of land and naval operations by the NATO Supreme Command and regional commands, as well as instructions for controlling their performance. Simultaneously, the informant Murat delivered yet another top secret NATO document which also contained instructions for conducting nuclear warfare against the USSR.

The GRU turned over these very important documents to Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and the Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Zakharov who, in turn, handed them over to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Nikita Khrushchev.

The Soviet leader was shocked to learn that his friend and WWII ally, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was secretly spying on the USSR. Furthermore, Eisenhower at first denied everything, then he assumed all responsibility, but did not bother to apologize and assure the Soviet leadership that there would be no more spying.

Khrushchev’s son Sergei wrote later: «The scars left on Father’s heart remained for good. The lie from the mouth of his «friend» struck a severe blow at his heart. He did not forgive Eisenhower, neither as a president nor a human being, for his lie.»

Then followed the plan for unleashing nuclear war against the Soviet Union, which entailed delivering nuclear strikes at defense facilities and cities of other socialist countries. Negotiating for peace and simultaneously planning nuclear strikes — that was regarded as unseemly conduct on Washington’s part. Now about the Berlin crisis. Relations between the USSR and the West had long remained strained over the German issue, and something had to be done to defend the German Democratic Republic. Therefore, on the night of August 12, 1961, under agreement with the East German government, the border between East and West Germany was officially closed. West Berlin was sealed off too; the move of course prompted a hostile reaction from the West. Some Western countries even suggested using force. However, U.S. president John Kennedy had more realistic views. He believed that East Germany had the right to do what it had already done, and did not intend to risk war because of this decision.

Nevertheless, immediately after the border between East and West Germany was closed, U.S. Vice President Lyndon Johnson arrived in West Berlin to display the firmness of the United States and the West. A parade of 1,500 U.S. marines, armed to the teeth, as well as combat vehicles sent to West Berlin especially for the occasion, were intended to be the focal point of a concerted display of strength.

Khrushchev ordered that no obstacles be put in these troops path. However, at one checkpoint, a GRU officer named I.V. Chitalin, now a retired colonel, in keeping within the agreed-upon procedure, seriously slowed down their advance. The troops were late for the parade, and holding the parade at night would be useless. The anticipated show of strength was thwarted. However, the tension in East-West relations persisted and continued to grow.

GRU sources, Murat and Giselle, again promptly provided Moscow with more well-documented information about NATO’s strategy. In particular, Soviet military intelligence received from Murat information concerning eight calculated war risk plans (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, etc.). Tension continued to escalate. The U.S. Administration sent General Clay to Berlin. Moscow sent Marshal Konev.

On October 28, 1961, the Americans planned to destroy frontier barriers at a checkpoint in Berlin. Soviet military intelligence received reliable information about the exact time when the operation was planned to begin, and even received information about the troops that were to take part in it. At first, events developed according to the plan worked out at General Clay’s headquarters. Three jeeps carrying soldiers and civilians were heading for a checkpoint near the Brandenburg Gate. They were followed by powerful bulldozers and ten tanks with their hatches closed and guns uncovered. In accordance with the Soviet counter plan, an infantry battalion and a regiment of Soviet tanks were deployed along side streets in the area. After the jeeps passed through the checkpoint unimpeded, Soviet tanks left the side streets to block the bulldozers’ way. The bulldozers stopped on the West-controlled territory before they reached the demarcation line. The Soviet tanks also stopped. The jeeps, cut off from the rest of the column by the Soviet tanks, turned around and returned to West Berlin. The American and Soviet tanks confronted each other almost all night long. Then, responding to an order from Moscow, the Soviet tanks turned around and moved back into side streets. Twenty or thirty minutes later the American tanks and bulldozers withdrew too.

This confrontation marked the end of the second Berlin crisis. The West recognized de facto the fixing of the frontier borders and the establishment of control over it by East Germany. Reliable information from GRU sources, such as Murat and Giselle, and skillful actions by GRU officers, such as retired Colonel Chitalin, contributed significantly to the peaceful settlement of this crisis.

Throughout those tense years, GRU officers worked hard to obtain documents and verbal reliable and preventive information concerning military and political issues from their sources or by themselves to prevent uncontrolled military actions.